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CARTEL PRICING AND THE STRUCTURE OF THE
WORLD BAUXITE MARKET*
I. Introduction
The future of the New International Economic Order depends to a great
extent on the ability of less developed countries to follow in the steps of
the OPEC countries and improve their terms of trade by cartelizing and
increasing the prices of the basic commodities that they export. The argu-
ment has been made, however, that the success of OPEC is an exceptional
phenomenon - that there is little potential for most LDC's to raise their
export commodity prices through cartelization, either because substitutes
for the commodities exist so that elasticities of demand are large, or because
there are too many producing countries with differing interests to form a
cohesive cartel. While this argument may be true for most commodities, it is
probably not true for bauxite. In the two-year period January 1974 to January
1976, members of the International Bauxite Association (IBA) imposed tax
levies that increased the f.o.b. price of bauxite from around $8 - $12/ton to
around $20 - $30/ton. It appears in fact, that the potential for percentage
increases in profits is greater for bauxite than it is for oil3 If oil is an
exception to the rule, bauxite may be an even greater exception.
1This argument has been made by Krasner [9]. For an opposing view, see Bergsten
[3 and Mikdashi [10]. For general discussions of cartel behavior and the
potential impact on commodity markets, see the Charles River Associates study
[ 4] and McNicol [10].
Jamaica nationalized 51% of its bauxite-alumina companies, and paid for these
with low interest notes. The price of Jamaican bauxite is net of the export
levy per ton, which is computed as (PAT) 20 0 0/ 4.3, where PA is the average
price of aluminum per pound in the U.S., 4.3 is the number of tons of Jamaican
bauxite that yield one ton of aluminum, and T is the levy, equal to .08 for
FY75-76 and .085 today. (This formula is applied to long tons of bauxiteJ)
Since the price of aluminum is now about 37¢ per pound, the per ton Jamaican
levy is about $14.60.
3An earlier study by this author [j5] computed for oil, bauxite, and copper,
the ratio of the sum of discounted- profits for a monopoly'cartel to that for
a competitive market. Using a 5% discount rate, the ratio was 1.63 for bauxite
and 1.54 for oil (with a 10% discount rate, the numbers were 4.95 and 1.94).
As we will see in this paper, recent increases in the price of energy give a
bauxite cartel even more potential for price (and profit) increases.
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The International Bauxite Association was formed in early 1974 by Jamaica,
Surinam, Guinea, Guyana, Australia, Sierra Leone, and Yugoslavia. Since 1974
the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Ghana, and Indonesia also became cartel members,
so that in 1975 IBA accounted for 85% of total non-Communist world bauxite
production. Admittedly the economic magnitude involved in IBA price increases
have not been large; the value of IBA bauxite shipments rose from $.5: billion
in early 1974 to about $1.2 billion in early 1976, as compared to an increase
in OPEC oil revenues from $20 billion in 1973 to around $110 billion in 1976.
On the other hand, these magnitudes are quite significant to the alumina and
aluminum producing industries, and are politically significant in that they
raise the expectations of the other developing countries.
Table 1 shows, for 1966 and 1975, bauxite production and proved reserves
for various producing countries. Note that the greatest change has been in
the position of Australia, which is now the largest producer of bauxite, holds
the largest proved reserve base, and has the most rapidly growing production
capacity. (Observe that the production of the U.S. and the other non-cartel
countries has remained about constant; the U.S. now imports about 90% of its
consumed-bauxite and alumina.) As Barnett [2 ] points out, there are indications
that Australia may be a weak link in the cohesiveness of IBA. Australia has not
increased its tax as have the other cartel members, and has thereby moved from
4
a position of competitive disadvantage (because of distance) to one of advantage.
Australia has recently been expanding its sales and relative share of the market
at the expense of the Caribbean countries, which have had constant or declining
sales, and declining market shares. And the squeeze on the Caribbean countries
may become tighter as Brazil begins to develop its potential reserves of bauxite.
41974 transport costs to the USA ranged from $1.00 to $6.00 per metric ton for
the Caribbean countries, but around $11.00 per metric ton for Australia. The
tax levies of the Caribbean producers, however, have been considerably greater
than these transport differentials. Source of data: Charles River Associates.
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TABLE 1 - BAUXITE PRODUCTION AND RESERVES
(Source of data: U.S. Bureau of Mines [16])
Cartel Members:
Australia
Jamaica
Surinam
Guinea
Guyana
Others
Cartel total
Non-Communist
Market Countries:
USA
France
Greece
Other
Market country
total
Total Non-Communist
Production and
Reserves
Production (mmt)
1966 1975
1.8 20.7
9.0 11.4
4.5 4.9
3.1 9.0
2.9 3.2
4.1 6.0
25.4 55.2
1.8 1.8
2.8 2.5
3.2}3.5 3.2
2.4
8.1 9.9
33.5 65.1
Proved Reserves (mmt)
1966 1975
3500 4500
600 1500
250 500
1200 4500
85 150
500 2500
6135 13650
45 40
70 40
} 520 20002000
635 2830
6770 16480
. . .
----
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There are two fundamental questions that are critical in assessing the
future evolution of the world bauxite market. First, assuming that the
existing configuration of the International Bauxite Association proved to be
a stable one, what kind of pricing and output policies might the cartel follow,
and how would these policies affect the world bauxite market? Second, to what
extent is IBA likely to suceed as a coherent, stable, and enduring cartel?
One way to answer the first question is to determine what an optimal policy
would be. This must be done in a dynamic context, so as to capture three
important aspects of the cartel pricing problem: the process of depletion of a
finite (proved plus potential) reserve base, the slow adjustment over time of
demand and supply to price changes, and the highly non-linear characteristic of
bauxite demand. Although proved reserves of most cartel members would, last
about 200 years at current production levels, reserves would last only 55 years
if production grows by 4% per year, so that depletion should be accounted for.
Dynamic adjustments of demand and supply must also be considered; bauxite supplies
from non-cartel members can increase only slowly in response to price increases,
so that a potential exists for large short-term gains to the cartel. Finally,
any calculation of optimal cartel prices must account for the fact that the
bauxite demand curve, while highly inelastic over a broad region, becomes almost
infinitely elastic above a certain critical price level at which alternatives
to bauxite become economical.
Answering the second question requires examining those factors that could
lead to cartel instability. This includes differing production costs by different
members, product heterogeneity across producers, and most important, the ability
of one or more cartel members to earn higher revenues by undercutting the cartel
-5-
price and expanding production. Australia is the one member of the cartel
for whom these factors are most likely to apply. Although production costs
are about the same, transport costs are larger, and since transport costs vary
across consumers, this provides a means of undercutting. Also, since Australia
has a rapidly growing capacity, it may be preferable for her to price and sell
bauxite outside the cartel boundaries.
To provide some answers to both questions we extend the earlier work of
this author 151 and calculate optimal cartel pricing policies using a simple
optimal control model that captures the basic aspects of the pricing problem
described above. These optimal policies are calculated for two alternative
configurations of the cartel. First, we assume that Australia remains a member
of the cartel, and produces a constant share of cartel output. Next, we assume
that Australia leaves the cartel and produces bauxite as part of the competitive
fringe of price takers. We can then determine the resulting change in the net
present value of the flow of cartel profits, and the change in the net present
value of the flow of profits to Australia. This tells us, first, to what extent
it might be in Australia's interest to leave the cartel, and second, to what
extent it is in the interest of the other cartel members to strike a bargain
with Australia over some kind of output rationalization scheme.
The next two sections of this paper focus on the characteristics of the
world bauxite market. First concentrating on bauxite demand, we will see that
the characteristics of the bauxite demand function (in particular the critical
price at which alternatives to bauxite become economical) depends highly on
world energy prices. We then examine the characteristics of bauxite production
and reserves for the major producing countries. In Section 4 we specify a
dynamic cartel pricing model, and use it to obtain optimal pricing policies
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under two alternative assumptions - first that Australia is part of the cartel,
and second that Australia is part of the competitive fringe. We also specify
and solve a static equilibrium model in which Australia is part of the fringe,
but has an infinitely elastic supply, and must adjust that supply optimally
given the price reaction function of the cartel. These models will help us to
determine whether it is in Australia's interest to leave the cartel, and how
leaving the cartel might affect the price of bauxite.
2. The Demand for Bauxite
Up to some critical price, the demand curve for bauxite is highly inelastic,
and this is one reason why a cartel like IBA has the potential to enjoy large
monopoly profits. At a bauxite price of $10.00 per ton, bauxite itself repre-
sents about 8 of the cost of producing aluminum, and if the price of bauxite
doubles to $20.00 per ton, its share in aluminum production costs would only
5
rise to 12%. It is unlikely that the short-run and long-run price elasticities
of aluminum demand are greater in magnitude than -0.2 and -1.0 respectively.6
Thus reasonable estimates for the short- and long-run price elasticities of
bauxite deumad would be-around "-Q16 and -.08 respeetrely. -Asasiofg-tiat at
The cost of alumina represents about 30% of the cost of producing aluminum.
At a $10.00 bauxite price, and using the Bayer process, bauxite represents
about 26% of the cost of producing alumina (see Table 4). At a bauxite price
of $20.00, bauxite represents 40% of the cost of producing alumina. In
fact only about 88% of bauxite and alumina consumed in the U.S. is used to
to produce aluminum. About 6% is used in the production of chemicals, 4%
in refractories and 2% in abrasives. Accounting for this, hever, would
not change our elasticity estimates significantly.
I have seen no econometric estimates of the elasticities of demand for alumi-
num. One would expect, however, these elasticities to be roughly comparable
to those for copper demand. Fisher, Cootner, and Bailey [5] estimate the long-
run elasticity of copper demand to be around -0.8, and Banks [1] estimates it
to be -1.0.
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current production levels, the production of aluminum from alumina and the pro-
duction of alumina from bauxite both face roughly constant returns to scale,
the income elasticities for bauxite should be about the same as that for
aluminum. A reasonable estimate for the long-run income elasticity of alumi-
num demand would be 1.0. For purposes of analysis, we therefore take the
short-run and long-run income elasticities of bauxite demand to be 0.2 and
1.0 respectively.
Should the price of bauxite rise above a certain level, it would
become more economical to produce alumina from sources other than bauxite,
so that the demand for bauxite would become almost infinitely elastic.
Clearly this critical price is a crucial determinant of the ability of a
bauxite cartel to raise prices beyond their current levels, and it is
therefore worthwile estimating this price as accurately as possible.
Alumina (A1203) can also be produced from high-alumina clays, dawsonite,
alunite, and anorthosite, all of which are in great abundance in the earth's
crust. Recently the U.S. Bureau of Mines estimated the fixed capital costs
and annual operating costs of producing alumina from high-alumina clay, from
anorthosite, and from bauxite [17]. There are some 18 alternative processes
by which alumina can be produced from clay, but the most economical (over a
fairly wide range of factor input costs) is the hydrochloric acid-ion exchange
7Again, no econometric estimates are available. If we use estimated income
elasticities for copper, 1.0 would be appropriate.
8Although there appears to be very little easily recoverable bauxite in the
U.S., there are large amounts of high-alumina clays, dawsonite, alunite, and
anorthosite. It is estimated, for example, that up to ten billion tons of
high-grade clay (25% to 35% alumina) could be available in Arkansas, Georgia,
and elsewhere in the U.S., and that one or two billion tons each of alunite
(37% alumina) could be available in Utah and Colorado, and large deposits
of anorthosite have been found in California, Wyoming New York, and
other states. For more detail, see Patterson [13] and Patterson and Dyni [14].
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process.9 There is only one economical process for producing alumina from
anorthosite, and that is the lime-soda sinter process, and although this is a
less economical way to produce alumina (given recent prices of clay and anor-
thosite), it is close enough in cost to make it worth considering. The standard
process by which alumina is produced from bauxite is the Bayer process.
The Bureau of Mines estimates are based on 1973 prices for factor
inputs, and I have updated these estimates to properly reflect 1976 prices.1
This updating has turned out to be critical, since the production of alumina
from clay and anorthosite is much more energy-intensive than its production
from bauxite, and energy prices have risen considerably in the last three
11
years. This has greatly increased the critical price at which bauxite is
no longer economical.1 2
Annual operating costs for producing alumina from clay using the hydro-
13
chloric acid-ion exchange process are shown in Table 2. Note that the
9Other clay-based processes that come close in cost are the nitric acid-ion
process exthange and the hydrochloric acid-isopropyl etherreztz-etion process.
1. .- ; - - -* - , 
10My earlier study [15] is based on the 1973 data.
Given a particular process for producing alumina, the energy requirements
per ton of alumina rise hyperbolically as the grade of the ore (percentage
content of alumina) decreases. Clay and anorthosite have, on an average.
much lower alumina content than bauxite. In addition, because of the par-
ticular technologies that are available to extract alumina, for any given
ore grade, use of anorthosite is more energy-intensive than use of clay,
which in turn is more energy-.intensive than use of bauxite. See Page and
Creasey [12].
1 2Some of the chemical inputs needed to produce alumina from clay have also
considerably risen in price.
1 3 In this process, clay is leached with hydrochloric acid to form a mixture of
aluminum chloride and iron chloride. An amine-ion exchange procedure is used
to remove the iron chloride, and the aluminum chloride is then crystalized
and decomposed to alumina. For more details, see [17].
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largest single factor cost is for natural gas, the wholesale industrial price
of which has more than doubled since 1973. The costs for producing alumina
from anorthosite using the lime-soda sinter process are shown in Table 3.
This process uses even more natural gas per ton of alumina, and is slightly
more costly than the hydrochloric acid-ion exchange process. The difference
is small enough, however, so that changes in the prices of raw materials could
make it preferable. Finally, the costs for producing alumina from bauxite
using the Bayer process are shown in Table 4. Note that total operating
costs are given as a function of the price of bauxite.
From Tables 2 and 4 we can easily compute the cross-over price at which
clay becomes a more economical source of alumina than bauxite. That price is
simply the solution to the equation
76.46 + 2.582P = 139.11 (1)
or P = $24.26 per short ton ($26.73 per metric ton). These calculations,
however, are based on plants operating in the United States where natural gas
prices (and energy prices in general) have been held below world market levels.
1 4 In this process anorthosite is blended and ground with limestone and soda
ash, and then heated to form sodium aluminate and calcium silicate. The cal-
cium silicate can be precipitated out by treatment with lime, the sodium
aluminate is carbonated to precipitate alumina trihydrate, which is heated
to form alumina. For details see [71?].
1 5In the Bayer process, bauxite is heated with a caustic solution to form a
solution of sodium aluminate, from which hydrated aluminum oxide can he
precipated and calcinated to obtain alumina.
16I did not have similar data available for the factor cost of alumina pro-
duction from bauxite or clay in other countries. Clearly these costs could
differ greatly across countries.
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Table 2
ANNUAL OPERATING COSTS, ALUMINA FROM CLAY
USING HYDROCHLORIC ACID-ION EXCHANGE PROCESS1
Raw Materials:
Raw clay at $1.32/ton
Hydrochloric acid at $57.24/ton
Organic solvent at $0.49/lb.
Chemicals for steamplant water treatment
TOTAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Annual Cost
(thousands of $)
$2,324.50
2,805.00
750.00
103.00
$5,982.50
Cost/ton
of alumina
$6.64
8.01
2.14
0.30
$17.09
Utilities:
Electricity at 1.7¢/kw-hr
Water, process at 14.5¢/Mgal
Water, raw at 1.45¢/Mgal
Natural gas at $1.10/MMBtu
TOTAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Direct labor: ($5.70/hr)
Plant maintenance:
Labor and supervision
Materials
TOTAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Payroll overhead: (35% of payroll)
Operating supplies: (20% of plant maintenance)
Indirect costs:2 (40% of direct labor and
Fixed Costs:
maintenance)
Capital cost3
Taxes4
Insurance4
TOTAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Total Oerating Costs
=== = ------- _====
$ 798.00
75.00
323.50
14,551.00
$15,747.50
$ 1,964.00
$ 2,269.00
1,731.00
$ 4,000.00
$ 1,482.00
$ 800.00
$ 2,386.00
$13,613.00
1,361.00
1,361.00
$16,335.00
,$4867 00
$ 2.28
0.22
0.93
$41.58
$45.01
$
$ 5.61
$ 6.47
$ 4.94
$11.41
$ 4.23
$ 2.28
$ 6.81
$38.89
3.89
3.89
$46.67
$139.11
--
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Table 3
ANNUAL OPERATING COSTS, ALUMINA FROM
ANORTHOSITE USING LIME-SODA SINTER PROCESS1
Raw materials:
Anorthosite at $3.31/ton
Limestone at $1.45/ton
Soda ash at $51.48/ton
Grinding material at $0.22/lb.
TOTAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Utilities:
Electricity at 1.7 cents/kW-hr.
Water, process at 14.5¢/Mgal
Water, raw at 1.45¢/Mgal
Natural gas at $1.10/MMBtu
TOTAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Direct labor: ($5.70/hr.)
Plant maintenance:
Labor and supervision
Materials
TOTAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Payroll overhead: (35% of payroll)
Operating supplies: (2n0 of plant maintenance)
Indirect costs: 2(40% of direct labor and
maintenance)
Fixed costs:
Capital cost3
Taxes4
Insurance4
TOTAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Annual Cost
(thousands of $)
$5,632
4,403
1,531
695
$12,261
$ 4,224
958
21
16,727
$21,930
$ 2,045
$ 1,476
984
$ 2,460
$ 1,232
$ 492
$ 1,802
$ 8,645
865
865
$10,375
Cost/ton
of alumina
$16.09
12.58
4.38
1.99
35.04
$12.07
2.74
0.06
47.79
$62.66
$ 5.84
$ 4.22
2.81
$ 7.03
$ 3.52
$ 1.41
$ 5.15
$24.70
2.47
2.47
$29.64
$52 597
=w=nrr
Total Operating Costs
=ts=M = = = _ = =
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Table 4
ANNUAL OPERATING COSTS, ALUMINA FROM BAUXITE
USING THE BAYER PROCESS1
Annual cost
Raw materials: (thousands of $)
Cost/ton
of alumina
Bauxite at $P/ton
Limestone at $1.45/ton
Soda ash at $51.48/ton
Starch at $130/ton
TOTAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Utilities:
Electricity at 1.7 cents/kW-hr.
Steam, 300 psig, at $1.80/Mlb
Water, cooling, at 2.9¢/Mgal
Water, process, at 14.50/Mgal
Natural gas at $1.10/MMBtu
TOTAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Direct labor:($5.70/hr)
Plant maintenance:
Operating supplies: (15% of plant maintenance)
Indirect costs:2 (50% of direct labor and
maintenance)
Fixed costs:
Capital cost3
Taxes and insurance4
TOTAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Total Operating Costs
$903.7xP
75
1351
274
$1700+903.7P
$ 425
4,961
28
102
1,867
$7,383
$2,304
$2,218
$ 333
$2,261
$8,811
1,762
$10,573
$27,872+903.7P
1==r======
$2.582xP
0.21
3.86
0.78
.;$4.85+2.582P
$ 1.21
14.17
0.08
0.29
5.33
$21.08
$ 6.58
$ 6.34
$ 0.95
$ 6.46
$25.17
5.03
$30.20
$76.46+2.582P
_ __
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NOTES TO TABLES 2, 3, and 4
All figures are in 1976 dollars, and are in terms of short tons. To convert
to equivalent metric ton figures, increase all numbers by 10 percent. For
each process, figures are based on a plant with capacity of 1000 tons of
alumina per day, and an average of 350 days of operation per year over the
life of the plant (allowing 15 days downtime per year for inspection, main-
tenance, and unscheduled interruptions). The numbers represent a cost updating
of the 1973 figures assembled by the U.S. Bureau of Mines [17]. Changes in
the unit costs of materials, utilities, labor, and capital are based on data
from the Survey of Current Business, and are summarized below:
Input 1973 cost 1976 cost
Raw clay $1.00/ton $1.32/ton
Anorthosite $2.50/ton $3.31/ton
Hydrochloric acid $27.00/ton $57.24/ton
Limestone $1.00/ton $1.45/ton
Price index, other chemicals 1.00 2.12
Electricity 1.0¢/kW-hr. 1.7¢/kW-hr.
Steam $0.90/Mlb $1.80/Mlb
Process water 10¢/Mgal 14.5¢/Mgal
Natural gas $0.50/MMBtu $1.10/MMBtu
Labor $4.50/hr $5.70/hr.
Price index, capital assets 1.000 1.336
2Indirect costs include expenses for control laboratories, accounting, plant
protection and safety, and plant administration. Research costs, and company
administrative costs outside the plant are not included.
3Assumes a 10% cost of capital, and ignores replacement costs.
4Taxes and insurance are each 1% of total plant costs.
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It is quite possible that through deregulation natural gas prices in the U.S. will
increase significantly in the near future, and this will change the cross-over
price. It is reasonable to assume a further doubling of the wholesale in-
dustrial price of natural gas to $2.20 per MMBtu (putting the price abbut
equal to the world market price of oil on a Btu equivalent basis). It is also
reasonable to assume that should this happen the cost of steam (used in the
Bayer process) would increase by 502 as well.1 7 In this case the cross-over
price is the solution to equation
88.88 + 2.58P - 180.69 (2)
18
or P $35.56 per short ton ($39.19 per metric ton). Thus higher energy prices
will greatly extend the inelastic region of the bauxite demand durve.
Clearly the demand function for bauxite will differ across consuming
regions. For purposes of crude analysis, however, it is useful to specify
a single function for total non-Communist bauxite demand. Using the short-
run and long-run price elasticities of -.016 and -.08 at a price of $15.00
per metric ton and total demand of 65.5 million metric tons (equal to actual
1974 demand), using short-run and long-run income elasticities of 0.2 and 1.0,
and assuming 3% real growth in the aggregate GNP of consuming countries, we
can specify the following bauxite demand function:
TDt [1.048 - .06986Pt + 13.1(1.03)t]e (Pt/ + .8TDt- (3)
where TD is total demand in millions of metric tons, and P is the critical price
17I am assuming here that natural gas currently provides about half of the
boiler fuel used to generate steam. I have not, however, been able to check
this assumption.
1 8Since natural gas prices are higher in other alimina-producing countries, the
current cross-over price probably varies from $24.26 per short ton in the U.S.
to nearly $35.00 in some European countries.
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at which alternatives to bauxite become economical. We will analyze the effects
of energy prices on potential bauxite cartel behavior by using two alternative values
for P, $26.73 and $39.19 (both per metric ton). By attaching a large enough
exponent to the term (Pt/P), we can achieve an arbitrarily close approximation
to a piecewise linear demand function. In fact we would expect demand to start
falling off at prices somewhere below the critical price P (if for no other
reason than in anticipation of future price increases), and demand to be small
but not zero at higher prices, so we choose 10 as the exponent. Long-run bauxite
demand functions for the two alternative values of P are plotted in Figure 1.
Z_, Bauxite Production and Reserves
The ability of IBA to increase its profits as it raises price depends
partly on the supply response of non-IBA countries, and, should it decide
to leave the cartel, Australia's ability to increase its output over time
in response to price increases. Unfortunately the determinants of bauxite sup-
ply are complicdated and difficult to describe in the context of a simple model.
Some bauxite producers are parts of the major vertically integrated aluminum
companies, the number of producers in each country varies across countries,
and changes in supply are brought about by other factors besides changes in
price. The potential (and proved) reserves of bauxite in the major producing
countries are large, so that conceivably any amount of bauxite could be pro-
duced, given the time required to increase capacity.
Looking at the pattern of bauxite production in different countries over
the last decade or so affirms that there is no simple supply function that can
be easily identified. Production levels for a number of countries are shown
-1B-
Figure 1 Long-Run Demand Curves
for Bauxite
N~
IN
N\TD (70.74 -.34(P/ I039 ) 9 )T D = (70.74 -3 493 P) e-
N
'x
TD = (70.74 -. 349 3P) e- (P /26 ' 93)10
TD = 70. 74-3493P
i
-7 C
. -
26
\
22
20
18
14
12
10
a
6
4
4,I,
I
-17-
for the last 15 years in Table 5. Bauxite prices remained roughly constant
from 1960 to 1971 (and were probably close to average production costs plus
average amortized exploration costs). During that time there was little
change in U.S. production, production in France increased by about 50X,
production in Guyana, Surinam and Jamaica about doubled, but production in
Australia increased from zero to about 14 million metric tons per year. Since
1971, and in particular over the last two years, bauxite ptices have doubled
or tripled. Production in the U.S., France, Jamaica and Surinam remained con-
stant or declined slightly, production in Guyana declined by about 35%, while
production in Australia increased by another 40% between 1972 and 1975. There
is no overall pattern of supply response to price changes that can be discerned
here.
Bauxite production costs also vary to a considerable extent across coun-
tries, although 1976 average production costs are fairly uniform at around
$6 to $7 per metric ton for those IBA countries with large proved reserves.
Average 1976 production costs (including fixed charges) for Jamaica were recent-
19
ly estimated to be $6.31 per metric ton. Production costs in 1974 were es-
timated to be $6.00 per metric ton in Australia, $6.00 in Guyana, $5.00 in
20
Surinam, $5.90 in Haiti, and $4.00 in the Dominican Republic. 1976 prod-
uction costs for the large Guinea-Boke project (current capacity about 6 million
tons per year) are much larger - about $11.00 per metric ton.2 1
Given the regional variation in production costs, reserves (see Table 1),
current and planned -capacity, and transportation costs, it seems clear that
1 9Figures obtained from conversations with World Bank officials.
20Source: Charles River Associates
21
Source: Conversations with World Bank officials. In 1968 costs were
projected to be about $5.40 per ton, but since then labor costs and capi-
tal costs almost doubled.
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TABLE 5 - BAUXITE PRODUCTION*
(quantities in thousands of metric tons)
Australia
O
50
350
889
1158
1800
4169
4880
7792
9200
12,343
14,205
15,800
17,535
20,700
Other
Free World
7452
7128
7379
7879
9080
10,700
10,200
11,400
12,200
13,600
14,700
15,000
11,900
17,900
20,600
* Source of data: U.S. Bureau of Mines [18]
U.S.
1228
1369
1525
1601
1654
1796
1654
1665
1843
2082
1988
1812
1880
1950
1800
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
Guyana
2374
2690
2210
2468
2638
2860
3328
3490
3700
4490
3757
3668
3224
3100
3200
France
2148
2127
1971
2387
2610
2760
2745
2756
2729
2940
3066
3203
3084
2863
2500
Jamaica
6663
7435
6903
7811
8514
8950 ·
9121
8391
10,333
11,800
12,565
12,345
13,385
15,086
11,400
Surinam
3351
3202
3427
3926
4291
4520
5200
5484
5451
5257
6162
6800
6580
7000
4900
.
.
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any accurate projection of bauxite supply would require a model with a high
degree of regional disaggregation. However, in order to analyze in at least
rough terms the potential behavior of IBA, we must make some assumptions
about average production costs and aggregate supply elasticities. Average
1976 production costs for IBA could reasonbly be taken to be about $7.00 per
metric ton, although we must recognize that these costs will increase slowly
over the years as higher grade reserves are depleted. We aggregate non-IBA
countries together and view them as competitive price takers with a long-run
supply of elasticity of 2. This elasticity may seem large given some of the
figures in Table 5, but we assume a ten-year mean adjustment between the short-
and long-run.
We must also account for reserve depletion in both IBA and non-IBA countries.
1975 IBA reserves were about 12,400 million metric tons; we assume that IBA pro-
duction costs rise hyperbolically from $7 per ton as these reserves are depleted,
i.e., IBA costs are given by 86,800/Rt, where Rt is reserves in mt. Averaging
over all countries, reserves are about 200 times current production levels.
As these reserves are used up, new ones will be found, but at higher cost, so
that the supply curve for the competitive fringe will move to the left over time.
We assume that after all current reserves are depleted, supply would be about
35% of its current level, given the current price.
Our assumptions about supply elasticities and the shift in supply as re-
serves are depleted lead to the following supply function for the non-IBA pro-
ducers:
St (-1.1 + .1467t)(1.005)-CSt/11 + .90S_ 1 (4)
where CS is cumulative supply (zero in 1975), and the initial supply level is
11 nmt/yr. At a price of $15 the long-run supply elasticity is then 2.0.
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4. Potential Pricin& Policies for IBA.
We can now lay out two versions of a simple aggregate model of the world
bauxite market, and use them to examine potential cartel pricing policies.
In the first version Australia remains part of IBA:
TD = [1.048 - .06986P + 13.1(1.03)] e (. + 80TDt (5)Tt t + '80 t-1 (5)
St = (-1.1 + .14 67Pt)(1.005) -CSt/ll + .90St l (6)
CSt = CSt-l t (7)
Dt Tt - St (8)
Rt =Rt- -Dt (9)
N 1 86,000
MaxW = [ t Rt t (10)
t~ 6) U+Ot t (10)
The equations for total demand (TD) and competitive supply (S) were discussed
above, CS is cumulative competitive supply, D is the net demand for IBA bauxite,
R is IBA reserves, and W is the sum of discounted profits. Quantities are in
millions of metric tons, and prices in 1976 dollars per metric ton. We solve
this model (i.e. determine the price trajectory that maximizes W) using a gen-
eral nonlinear optimal control algorithm developed by Hnyilicza [7]. Initial
conditions for the solution correspond to actual 1974 data: TDo - 65.5 mmt/yr,
SO = 11.0 mmt/yr, R = 12,400 mat, and CSo = 0. The time horizon N is large
enough (60 years) to approximate an infinite-horizon solution, and the discount
rate 6 is chosen to be 5%.
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In the second version of this model, Australia is included as part of the
competitive fringe. This involves modifying the supply equation,
St (-2.9 + 3867Pt)(1.005) CSt/29 + .90St 1 (6a)
and the cartel objective function,
N 1N 1E - 5 8 , 1 0 0]D
MaxW i Z (i+6)t [Pt - R t
~]t-l tR(10a
The initial conditions are now TD = 65.5, S 29.0, R = 8300, and CS - 0.0 0 0 0
The solutions to both versions of the model are given in Table 6, and
the optimal price trajectories and profits to Australia are shown graphically
in Figures 2 and 3. The initial decline in prices reflects the ability of the
cartel to enjoy large short-run profits by taking advantage of the lags in the
response of total demand and competitive supply to higher prices. In both
cases prices gradually approach the limit price ($26.76) at which alternatives
to bauxite become economical. Comparing the price trajectories for the two ver-
sions of the model, we see that prices are lower for about the first 25 years,
but later higher, when Asutralia is part of the competitive fringe. If the
fringe becomes larger at the expense of the cartel, the optimal price trajec-
tory would become closer to ;-at would prevail in a competitive market, and for
an exhaustible resource the monopoly price is initially higher, and later
lower, than the competitive price.
It is not clear from these results whether it would pay for Australia to
leave the cartel. Australia's sum of discounted profits for the first 20 years
is larger if it leaves the cartel, but over 50 years it is smaller, and over
-22-
Table 6 - Solutions of Dynamic Bauxite Model
Version 1 - Australia in Cartel
TD
65.50
63.16
61.86
61.35
61.43
61.95
68.33
77.79
88.99
101.77
116.26
132.62
151.04
171.80
195.64
D
54.50
51.12
48.95
47.69
47.13
47.11
51.71
60.34
71.21
83.97
98.61
115.23
113.96
115.06
179.27
R
12400.00
12348.90
12299.90
12252.20
12205.10
12158.00
11911.00
11627.70
11294.10
10900.50
10437.50
9895.42
9263.97
8531.89
7685.52
d
790.22
690.44
619.06
567.26
529.11
500.52
427.07
391.92
363.35
335.13
306.05
275.95
244.80
212.39
177.73
- Australia
D
36.50
33.89
32.39
31.74
31.68
32.04
36.97
44.52
54.01
65.38
78.55
93.38
109.60
126.85
145.36
in Compet
R
8300.00
8266.12
8233.72
8201.98
8170.30
8138.26
7964.76
7758.07
7507.75
7204.32
6838.62
6402.00
5886.95
5287.55
4598.61
itive Fringe
IT ***
d
438.21
369.98
325.43
297.32
280.23
270.17
257.50
255.66
251.61
243.68
231.35
214.42
192.79
166.26
133.84
Discounted
**
Discounted
profits to
profits to
cartel including Australia (millions
Australia
of 1976 dollars)
Discounted profits to cartel, excluding Australia
P
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
22.22
21.92
21.70
21.54
21.44
21.38
21.41
21.64
21.90
22.15
22.40
22.64
22.88
23.10
23.23
**
1 Ad
260.99
228.04
204.46
187.35
174.75
165.31
141.05
129.44
120.01
110.69
101.08
91.14
80.85
70.15
58.70
2
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
P
19.61
19.07
18.69
18.47
18.40
18.44
19.21
20.02
20.72
21.32
21.86
22.37
22.87
23.35
23.72
Version
TD
65.50
64.22
64.46
64.83
65.59
66.64
74.28
84.11
95.42
108.10
122.14
137.46
153.90
171.18
189.53
**
HAd
215.50
207.59
199.09
191.43
185.09
179.89
159.98
140.07
119.41
99.55
81.62
66.13
53.15
42.43
33.46
. .
. . .
.
-
-:
-
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t
Discounted Profits to
25
>4.U
22.0
20.0
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I
F igure 3 Austraolia
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22
either time horizon the difference is small. Since few governments have
planning horizons longer than ten years, the shorter time horizon is probably
more meaningful, and we might argue that it is marginally in Australia's in-
terest to leave the cartel.
A key question here is the extent to which Australia can increase its out-
put without incurring large increases in marginal and average cost. We assumed
above that as part of the fringe Australia would have the same long-run supply
elasticity (2.0) as the other competitive producers. It is likely, however,
that Australia's supply is much more elastic than that of other countries.
It would be reasonable, in fact, to assume that Australia's supply is infinitely
elastic, and that it can produce almost any amount of bauxite at a constant
average cost of $7 per ton.
This assumption leads to a quite different model of the bauxite market.
As part of the fringe, Australia would be a price taker as before (IBA would
still set price to maximize its profts), but would determine its quantity -
given the expected price reaction of the cartel - to maximize its own profits.
We have in effect a Stackelberg model of market behavior, and we can solve
this model if it is expressed as a static long-run equilibrium approximation
to the model of equations (5)-(10).
We write the static (long-run) total demand function for 1980 as
10
TD (77.29 - .3493P) e- ( '0 3 7 4 1 P) (11)
A22istralia makes larger profits during the first two years as part of IBA since
as part of the fringe its awn supply can adjust only slowly in response to
price increases. In the next twenty years its profits are lower as part of
IBA since net cartel demand is reduced as the fringe expands its output.
Higher output as part of the finge during the first twenty years, however,
means lower output later as reserves are depleted.
-25-
and the supply function of the competitive ftinge, excluding Australia, as
S -11.0 + 1.467P (12)
Denoting Australia's output by Qa, the net demand to the cartel is then
D = TD - S - (13)
We assume that the cartel adjusts price in response to Australia's output,
which it takes as given:
Cartel: Max n = (P-7)(TD(P) - S(P) - Qa)
P
(14)
Substituting (11) and (12) into (14), we have the following approximate re-
acion unc n fr the cartel:23
action function for the cartel:
P = 28.06 - .28 Qa (15)
We now assume that Australia chooses its profit-maximizing output given this
reaction function:
Australia: Max Ia = (28.06 - .28Qa - 7)Qaaa a (16)
This implies Qa = 37.6 mmt/yr and P $17.53.
2 3The exact reaction function is found by solving the following equation
for P in terms of Qa:
21.27 - 2.93P + e
-(.03741P) 10 (.03741)l(3.P 797)
!-(.0374 P) [79.74 - .70 + (.03741P) (3.5? - 797)
+ 202 (.03741P)9 = Qa
However, for prices less than $20 (Qa greater than 28 mmt/yr), equation (15)
is correct to within 2% of the true price.
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In Table 7 we summarize the 1980 equilibrium bauxite prices, undiscounted
profits, demand and supply implied by the three alternative sets of assumptions
analyzed above. Cases 1 and 2 correspond to the dynamic optimal pricing model,
first with Australia in IBA, and then with Australia in the finge, with
a long-run supply elasticity of 2.0. Case 3 corresponds to the static model
where Australia is in the fringe, but has an infinite long-run supply elasticity.
Note that Australia's profits in Cases 1 and 2 are nearly the same, but are
considerably increased in Case 3. Comparing Case 3 with Case 1, we see that if
Australia can increase production with no increase in average cost, it can almost
double its profits by more than doubling its output. Profits to the other car-
tel members fall by more than half, but it is still optimal for the cartel
members to maintain a price that is only about $4 lower.
Australia's actual supply characteristics probably lie somewhere between
the representations in Cases 2 and 3. It is likely that Australia could greatly
increase its output over the next five years, but its average cost might rise
by a few dollars. If this is the case, it indeed seems in Australia's interest
to leave the cartel - and it also seems in the interest of the other cartel mem-
bers to make whatever adjustments are necessary to induce Australia to remain
in the cartel. Such adjustments would probably mean allowing Australia to con-
siderably increase its market share at the expense of the other members. Higher
profits could then be made by everyone by maintaining a higher price. If
Australia's output share of IBA production were 67%, as in Case 3, but the cartel
maintained a price of $21.44, as in Case 1, Australia's profits would rise to
$456 million, and profits to the other members of IBA would rise to $225 million.
(See Case 4 in Table 7.) Of course we have no way of knowing whether this
bargaining agreement, or for that matter, any agreement, would occur. If an
-27-
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agreement were to occur, the division of output among the cartel members would
depend on relative bargaining power, and might be somewhere in between the out-
put shares of Cases 1 and 3.24
5. Concluding Remarks
Given IBA's current configuration, its optimal price of bauxite today is
about $22, and this is quite close to the actual price. IBA may or may not know
that it is now pricing bauxite optimally, but if the cartel remains in its pre-
sent form and continues to price optimally, the (real) price of bauxite would
fall slightly to ust over $21 in 1980, and then rise by no more than 0.2% per
year for the next few decades.
Should Australia leave the cartel, however, the price of bauxite would
probably fall by $3 or $4. There is a strong incentive for Australia to leave,
since by doing so it could nearly double its profits. Although the other car-
tel members also have an incentive to keep Australia in the cartel, their bar-
gaining power is limited, and any agreement (over output shares) acceptable to
Australia would still leave the rest of IBA with greatly reduced profits.
Our calculations of optimal prices were based on certain assumptions about
energy prices. We have seen that an increase in energy prices (in particular
the price of natural gas) would result in an extension of the inelastic region
of the total demand function for bauiite, and this could considerably increase
the optimal cartel price.(whether or not Australia is a member.of the cartel).
A doubling of the wholesale price of natural gas, for example, would probably
24Nash bargaining theory provides a framework for determining relative bar-
gaining power and a likely division of output. For an application of this
theory o the analysis of the OPEC oil cartel, see Hnyilicza and Pindyck
[8].
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increase the optimal price to about $30 if Australia is in IBA, and about
$25 otherwise. On the other hand, we have also assumed that no new major pro-
ducers of bauxite enter the world market in the coming years. By 1982 Brazil
might have the capacity to produce some 4 mt of bauxite per year at a cost of
about $6 per ton, and this could significantly reduce any optimal cartel price,
particularly if Australia is not in the cartel. Thus our analysis of optimal
cartel prices can only be conditioned on the future of such exogneous factors
as energy prices and entry of new producers.
The analysis i this paper is based on an extremely crude and over-simpli-
fied model of the world bauxite market. The main shortcoming of our model is
that it ignores the important regional characteristics of the bauxite market.
The cost and other determinants of bauxite production, and the quality of bau-
xite produced, vary across regions, as do the nature of the contracts that
producers write with alumina and aluminum producing companies. And we have
ignored transportation costs, which are a large component of the c.i.f. cost
of bauxite, and would be a major factor in Australia's pricing and output de-
cisions. Better projections of prices and output require a detailed and
regionally disaggregated model of the world bauxite market. The construction
of such a model should be an objective of future research.
-30-
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